Good as His Word

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A legal obligation is not the same as a moral obligation. There is a formality in the law, especially the law of contracts, that sets it apart from the dictates of justice.

The patriarchal narratives in Genesis derive much of their dramatic force—not to mention instructive power—from this tension between legal and moral standards. That is one reason for their timeless appeal. The chasm between legal and moral responsibility has never been fully bridged. Legal forms, in the hands of the unscrupulous, can be an instrument of injustice, in ancient times as today.

In some Biblical contracts a solemn oath creates an irrevocable commitment, even though given under a misapprehension or obtained by deceit. Take Jacob, for example, the younger twin. By ancient custom his elder brother, Esau, was entitled to a double portion of inheritance from their father Isaac. Jacob attempts to correct this misfortune by a series of legal maneuvers.

First, when Esau is famished and requests some of Jacob’s lentil stew, Jacob demands his elder brother’s inheritance in exchange (Genesis 25:29–32). Technically this may be a valid legal contract, but readers easily perceive the injustice of such a lopsided deal. Jacob has acted unjustly by exploiting his starving brother’s weakness. Formally, it is a valid legal bargain, but morally, Jacob has taken unfair advantage of his starving brother.

Perhaps realizing the tenuous morality of the bargain, Jacob moves to reinforce his legal position by insisting on a formal oath from Esau (Genesis 25:33–34). Esau’s oath places a curse upon himself should he go back on his 052word. That curse, once spoken, acquires a life of its own.

Perhaps Jacob can be defended by suggesting that he simply drives a hard bargain. But later he goes further. He stoops to fraud and deceit. Once again he exploits the other party’s weakness—in this case his father’s blindness: Isaac, now old and near death, has promised to give Esau a blessing in return for a meal. He says to his elder son:

“Now then, take your weapons, your quiver and your bow, and go out to the field and hunt game for me. Then prepare for me savory food, such as I like, and bring it to me to eat, so that I may bless you before I die” (Genesis 27:3–4).

Instigated by his mother, Rebekah, Jacob pretends to be Esau and supplies the meal himself while Esau is out hunting. In order to resemble his hairy brother, Jacob drapes goatskins on himself. He even dons Esau’s clothes, which smell of the fields. The father is deceived. Isaac accepts the meal that Rebekah has prepared, consumes it with gusto, and in return gives Jacob his blessing (Genesis 27:5–29).

Despite the immorality of Jacob’s deception, the Biblical text nevertheless regards the blessing of Jacob as legally valid. Indeed, the text emphasizes the validity of the contract. Isaac has received the benefit of the bargain: He consumed the meal. And his blessing is then given as a solemn pronouncement (Genesis 27:28–29)—much like Esau’s earlier oath that makes it permanently binding on the speaker. Isaac tells the outraged Esau when he discovers Jacob’s deception: “I blessed him; now he must remain blessed!” (Genesis 27:33).

In both cases, Jacob exploits a weakness of the person with whom he is bargaining—his brother’s hunger and his father’s blindness. In both cases, he makes fair payment (in the form of a meal) in exchange for what he wants. In both cases, Jacob secures the completed “contract” against possible claims of injustice through a binding oath—an 054unjust bargain is “legalized” by a strict formality.

Furious at seeing himself cheated again, Esau resolves to nullify the contract by killing his brother, but Jacob is forewarned by his mother Rebekah and flees (Genesis 27:41–45). In due course he arrives at the home of his uncle Laban, where he is welcomed as a member of the family.

After a month, Laban recognizes that Jacob should receive compensation for working as a shepherd and asks Jacob to name his wage. Jacob proposes that he work for seven years in exchange for Rachel, the younger of Laban’s two daughters. Laban agrees, and a bargain is struck that would have been very familiar to ancient ears: It is a so-called “shepherd’s contract,” examples of which are described in ancient Mesopotamian writings (). Such contracts provide that the hired shepherd will look after the owner’s flock, typically mixed sheep and goats, until the time of shearing. The shepherd must then return the original number of animals plus an agreed minimum in natural growth. As a custodian of another’s property, the shepherd is not allowed to eat the animals himself, although he may take their milk. The shepherd’s remuneration can take different forms, for example, a share in the profits, by taking any growth in the herd in excess of the agreed minimum, or a fixed sum. While usually paid at the end of the season, he can also receive payment in advance. If he fails to produce the agreed minimum, he is obliged to make up the deficit himself, but he is not liable for losses due to “acts of God” (accidents) or wild beasts.

Genesis 31:39–42 alludes to this type of shepherd’s contract and provides quite specifically that, if the shepherd claims that the herd has been diminished by the predation of wild beasts, the shepherd must bring the remains of the carcass as evidence to relieve himself of liability.

Jacob holds up his end of the shepherd’s contract. He works for seven years. At the completion 055of his service, he requests the preagreed payment: to have Rachel for his wife. Laban, appearing to comply, gathers “the people of the place” together and makes a feast. But in the evening, under the cloak of darkness, he delivers his older daughter, Leah, to Jacob’s tent instead of Rachel. Only in the morning does Jacob discover the deception after he has consummated his marriage to Leah (-Genesis 29:21–25).

Jacob has been victimized by almost exactly the sort of legalistic manipulation he employed to secure Isaac’s blessing! There the bargain was a meal in exchange for a blessing by a blind father. Here it is seven years of service in exchange for conjugal privileges. Laban takes advantage of Jacob’s “blindness” in the darkness of the wedding chamber to substitute the elder sister for the younger, Leah for Rachel, on the wedding night. In both cases, a last minute substitution was made, to the disadvantage of an unwitting “blind” party. Perhaps Jacob could have claimed his marriage to Leah void and demanded his rightful bride. But just as Isaac had received the benefit of the bargain—his meal—Jacob had received his conjugal privilege with Leah.^a Moreover, Laban’s defense for his deception—“This is not done in our country, giving the younger before the firstborn” (Genesis 29:26)—is a stark reminder that Jacob is on very weak moral ground: His own deception had violated the protocol of firstborn privileges that belonged to Esau. In sum, Jacob has been given a taste of his own medicine. He has become the victim in the same sort of legalistic manipulation that he had previously used to victimize Esau. Laban has not adhered to the letter of the agreement, but there is a certain justice in the outcome nonetheless.

To appease the distraught Jacob (and keep up the obviously lucrative shepherding arrangement), Laban proposes a compromise. If Jacob will accept Leah and complete the seven-day nuptials formalizing their marriage, Laban will give him Rachel as well—in exchange for a further seven years’ service. To secure Jacob’s agreement, Laban throws in a sweetener: Jacob will not have to wait until the end of the contract to secure his beloved Rachel. Instead he will be paid up front. Jacob agrees, takes Rachel as his wife, and proceeds to serve a further seven years, honoring his part of the contract (Genesis 29:27–30).

By the end of his second term of seven years, Jacob, who has by now fathered 12 children by his two wives and their two maids (11 sons and daughter Dinah). He now wishes to return to his home and take his family with him. But Laban persuades him to stay on for another seven years by proposing a new bargain: “Name your wages and I will give it” (Genesis 30:28). Jacob responds to Laban’s apparent largesse with a seemingly modest, but unconventional proposal. He will continue to manage the flock, and take as his compensation only those animals that are dappled or speckled (Genesis 30:32).

Contrary to his appearance of generosity, however, Laban now reveals his true colors. He cheats. He accepts Jacob’s offer, but before turning the herd over to him, he removes all the dappled and speckled animals (Genesis 30:35). This ruse, presumably, would yield Jacob few if any dappled or speckled offspring for his share.

But Jacob is able to overcome this disadvantage without reneging on his bargain with Laban. With God’s help, Jacob designs some artful breeding techniques, which result in all the strongest and healthiest offspring being dappled or spotted, and thus for his account (Genesis 30:37–43).

It could be argued that Laban has not violated the letter of the bargain, which did not specify that he would deliver to Jacob dappled or spotted brood stock from which he could expect dappled or spotted offspring. But that was certainly implicit in the spirit of the agreement. In response, Jacob has employed unconventional breeding techniques; this too was not envisioned by the spirit of the agreement. But Jacob has, so to speak, fought fire with fire, and it soon emerges that he behaved nobly in the face of further cheating by Laban.

Despite Laban’s efforts, Jacob’s flocks continue to increase and soon enough he attracts the resentment of Laban’s sons as well. Jacob decides that the only course open to him is to take his family and flee. Laban and his kinsmen give pursuit and catch up with Jacob in the hill country of Gilead. Laban accuses Jacob of being deceitful, but Jacob is now able to defend himself with the full force of his moral position. He reveals that Laban made ongoing efforts to cheat while he kept to his bargain, not even taking advantage of his strict rights as a shepherd:

“These twenty years I have spent in your service, your ewes and she-goats never miscarried, nor did I feast on rams from your flock. That which was torn by beasts I never brought to you; I myself made good the loss; you exacted it of me, whether snatched by day or snatched by night. Often, scorching heat ravaged me by day and frost by night; and sleep fled from my eyes. Of

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the twenty years that I spent in your household, I served you fourteen years for your two daughters, and six years for your flocks; and you changed my wages time and again. Had not the God of my father, the God of Abraham and the Fear of Isaac, been with me, you would have sent me away empty-handed. But God took notice of my plight and the toil of my hands, and He gave judgment last night” (Genesis 31:38–42).

Seemingly overcome by the force of Jacob’s argument, Laban relents. The two parties make a covenant before God of mutual support and part company. Jacob the youthful trickster has, through bitter experience, become a man of justice (and is now fit to come to terms with God and with his brother Esau).

As these paired stories illustrate, even in ancient times there was a recognition of the difference between legal obligations and moral ones. In each of these episodes, we see how the protagonist is forced to confront the difference between the legal and the just and how he learned from that experience.

A legal obligation is not the same as a moral obligation. There is a formality in the law, especially the law of contracts, that sets it apart from the dictates of justice. The patriarchal narratives in Genesis derive much of their dramatic force—not to mention instructive power—from this tension between legal and moral standards. That is one reason for their timeless appeal. The chasm between legal and moral responsibility has never been fully bridged. Legal forms, in the hands of the unscrupulous, can be an instrument of injustice, in ancient times as today. In some Biblical contracts a […]