Moreover, the Bible’s use of angels, instead of God, to state that Abraham did not “[intend to] withhold” his son, actually suggests the opposite conclusion. In Jewish tradition (based on the, story of creation in Genesis and other biblical and talmudic sources), angels—in contrast to man, who is born with free will—are perfect in their essence, and therefore lack the capacity for or understanding of moral choice and intent. They can comprehend only human actions (see discussion by Rabbi Chayyim Hezekiah Medini [1833–1905], in his 18-vol. quasi-talmudic encyclopedia, Sedei Chemed). Thus, for example, the angels objected to the creation of man because he is subject to sin, and they cannot forgive a repentant sinner; they lack understanding of his temptation and later change of heart (see Exodus 23:21 and the authoritative medieval biblical commentary of Rashi). The Akedah, therefore, is indirectly and subtly telling us that angels could not have known what Abraham intended to do; and is contrasting their mechanical obedience to God’s will (evident by their believing and praising Abraham’s apparent obedience to God’s command to kill Isaac) with Abraham’s silent moral response—which was to question and, if ultimately necessary, resist that terrible command.