How to Reduce Archaeological Looting

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Readers of Archaeology Odyssey are no doubt aware of the magazine’s dedication to finding a realistic and effective solution to the problem of rampant archaeological looting.

As economists, we first became interested in archaeological regulations and markets in artifacts after reading about the public uproar concerning the fate of an ancient stone formation in downtown Miami, Florida, which was dubbed the “Miami Circle.” After a protracted legal and political battle, the local and state governments bought the site (for over $26 million) from its owner, who had intended to develop it for commercial use.^a

It seems obvious that such a large government expenditure is not a dependable way of dealing with threats to known and possible archaeological sites. We propose a different solution: allowing markets to become a positive force in the preservation of archaeological artifacts and the reduction of destructive looting.

We recognize that this proposal sounds alarms in the minds of many archaeologists. Indeed, much of the archaeology establishment pushes for tighter regulations on markets in artifacts, even vilifying collectors and trying to put antiquities dealers out of business. Archaeology Odyssey and its sister publications have been virtually alone in exploring how markets might be used as a positive influence in the preservation of the archaeological record and the prevention of looting.

Archaeologists generally support a type of solution known to economists as “command and control”: Politically controlled government regulators dictate how materials will be handled. This approach has been put into practice, in varying degrees, in many countries rich in archaeological finds. The results have not been good; looting and the trade in illicitly obtained artifacts are widespread and burgeoning. An estimate in the 1980s by Willamette University law professor James Nafziger put the underground market in such art works at over one billion dollars per year. Some believe that figure has now risen to as high as three billion dollars a year.

The losses from looting are of several kinds. Many artifacts not deemed commercially valuable, such as animal bones, pollen and seed samples, and even pottery sherds, are simply thrown out or destroyed by looters. In addition, both looted sites and recovered objects become less valuable. Once the sites have been disturbed and the looted objects have been removed from their proper context, both the artifacts and the sites lose much of their capacity to contribute information about the past.

The typical response to this problem is to call for greater controls, if not an outright ban, on the trade in archaeological artifacts. This approach is doomed to failure because people will always want to buy antiquities. Even when some buyers are removed from the market, the supply continues, albeit at a decreased pace. And with no legitimate alternatives for collectors, the price of looted artifacts increases, thus providing a stronger incentive for those willing to flout the law by looting. 045At best, regulations can make it more difficult for looters in some places to ply their trade. But given the vast array of artifacts scattered throughout the world, this is hardly significant. Governments alone will never be able to stop looting.

There is, however, a class of individuals with a long history of protecting property better than the government: property owners. People with a financial interest in the preservation of valued resources generally find ways, consistent with their own interests, to keep them well preserved. To harness such incentives to work for the preservation of archaeological artifacts, we propose two rules:

1) Assure that potential archaeological sites will have value for their owners by giving private landowners clear and transferable titles to artifacts found on their land, provided that the objects are excavated by a qualified archaeologist and the results are adequately published.

2) Allow the free import, export and sale of artifacts thus recovered.

Collectors will pay more for artifacts that are properly excavated and researched using the best possible techniques. Such artifacts are more valuable than those about which little is known. Even opponents of markets admit this. And the antiquities dealers, frequently maligned by archaeologists, are quick to point out which of their artifacts have been properly researched. We recently received a sales brochure from a dealer illustrating this factor. Even before the item was described, large headlines in the brochure proclaimed that it had been properly studied and recorded.

Appropriately excavated and researched objects are also more valuable because buyers can be confident that they are getting a real artifact and not a fake.

In an open market for well-researched artifacts, archaeologists, too, will benefit—from increased market value of the artifacts they find, and the resulting increase in the value of actual and potential sites. Their studies will not only add to society’s knowledge; they will also provide a valuable service to landowners and collectors, one that landowners and collectors will be willing to pay for by making funds available for archaeological studies.

Today, many collectors and dealers regard archaeologists less positively because the archaeology establishment goes to such lengths to condemn their activities. But in an open market, collectors would have a strong financial incentive to cooperate with archaeologists. Investors, as well as collectors and dealers, might well provide archaeologists with funds to conduct proper research as part of a package in which they can market or collect artifacts following their study. Collectors and artifact owners would gain from this cooperation because their treasures would be more valuable and prestigious—and archaeologists would gain added support for their research.

Skeptical archaeologists point out that research on a given site may or may not produce valuable artifacts. After all, much of the information gleaned from archaeological research comes not from museum-quality treasures but from small, undistinguished pieces in which collectors have little interest. Many productively researched sites have yielded few potentially salable artifacts. Knowledge 046is produced, but not merchandise. Even so, the revenue gains to archaeology in this situation will still be substantial and add to current sources of funding.

Archaeology, like cattle ranching or gold mining, produces multiple products that yield multiple revenue streams. The cattle grower produces meat, hides and perhaps breeding stock. In addition, some ranches produce cowboy-like experiences for tourists, adding another revenue stream to support the ranch. Similarly, gold mines produce other products, such as silver, in addition to the gold the miners are primarily seeking. It is the sum of all the revenues that can support the continuation and expansion of an operation, whether it be cattle ranches, gold mines or archaeological research. More products mean more value produced and the opportunity to gain more revenues. Thus the dig that yields no artifacts may still yield revenues from other sources. Just the prospect of finding valuable treasures would ensure interest in a site. A cooperative, productive relationship between collectors and archaeologists, even at sites unlikely to produce valuable display pieces, would have value simply for the prestige that such philanthropic activity would bring to collectors and their collections. Moreover, a site known to contain no artifacts holds little interest for looters anyway.

The vast collections of treasures currently stored by museums, government agencies and others would also increase in value. Not only would they continue to have value for pure research, as they do today, but they, like potential archaeological sites, should be considered as “mines” that may contain marketable artifacts as well as knowledge to be gleaned from the stored material.

Would selling artifacts to collectors and museums make them unavailable for future research? Not necessarily. When objects are sold, collectors could be required to register them so that they can be recalled if needed. This registry might naturally evolve from insurance practices. Owners of valuable antiquities often like to insure them. Insurers normally require that the location of insured art objects—paintings, for example—be recorded in a registry that is kept up to date. In addition, unique artifacts might be sold with a contract that allows the seller to recall the item for nondestructive testing or to repurchase it by refunding the purchase price if it is needed for testing that would damage or destroy the object.

In effect, we are urging that well-provenanced antiquities of superior value and prestige be made available to collectors instead of looted objects. This will reduce the demand for looted artifacts, which in turn would reduce the reward for looting (that is, reduce the price of looted artifacts), making plunder less attractive. As Hershel Shanks has suggested, those who previously earned a living as pot hunters or looters might even be hired to assist archaeological teams in the far more productive task of proper archaeological research.^b

The antimarket stance of archaeologists is preventing them from serving a vast market of collectors. In doing so, they also reject a large revenue stream that would support their own work, and they deny landowners an incentive to reduce looting. As a consequence, the objects have less value for society—and archaeologists must make do with fewer resources, resources they could gain if they harnessed the market to deal with the problem of archaeological looting.

Readers of Archaeology Odyssey are no doubt aware of the magazine’s dedication to finding a realistic and effective solution to the problem of rampant archaeological looting. As economists, we first became interested in archaeological regulations and markets in artifacts after reading about the public uproar concerning the fate of an ancient stone formation in downtown Miami, Florida, which was dubbed the “Miami Circle.” After a protracted legal and political battle, the local and state governments bought the site (for over $26 million) from its owner, who had intended to develop it for commercial use.a It seems obvious that such […]